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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jeremy J. Cook appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 
reconsider the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Cook pleaded guilty to felony DUI.  (R., pp. 85-86.)  He directly appealed 
from his judgment of conviction, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 
State v. Cook, Docket No. 43258, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 372 (Ct. App., 
February 3, 2016). 
 Cook filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  (R., pp. 5-15.)  In it, 
he set forth multiple allegations against trial counsel, including that counsel 
“continuously lied to petitioner throughout this case,” threatened Cook’s family, 
and “tried to extort money” from Cook’s family.  (R., p. 7 (capitalization altered).)  
He also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because, among other things, 
“there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented or heard that 
would require vacation of the conviction and sentence, and in the best interest of 
justice.”  (R., p. 6 (capitalization altered).)  Cook supported his petition with his 
own affidavit.  (R., pp. 12-15.)  Cook also filed a motion for appointment of 
counsel, which was granted.  (R., pp. 21-25, 89-90.) 
 The state filed an answer (R., pp. 36-39) and a motion for summary 
dismissal (R., pp. 101-09).  The state alleged, among other things, that Cook 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing either deficient 
performance or prejudice, and that Cook had “not shown that there was 
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inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other objectively discoverable 
failures of his attorney.”  (R., pp. 106-07.) 
 The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss.  (R., pp. 118-26.)  
With respect to the claims that trial counsel extorted and lied to Cook and his 
family, the court concluded that these accusations were either unsupported, 
belied by the information in the record, or not viable claims for relief.  (See R., 
pp. 121-24.)  As to Cook’s claims that trial counsel “was ineffective for refusing to 
examine evidence, refusing to speak to or listen to Petitioner’s witnesses, and 
failing to present a defense,” the court concluded those claims were not 
supported by admissible evidence.  (R., p. 123.)  The district court found that 
Cook didn’t state what the evidence was, what it could have shown, who the 
putatively favorable witnesses were, what they could have said, or what 
defenses trial counsel “should have put forth, but did not.”  (R., p. 123.)  
Additionally, the court found that these claims were belied by the record, and to 
the extent they could have constituted non-jurisdictional defenses, Cook waived 
“any such defense” when he pleaded guilty.  (R., pp. 123-24 (citing Heartfelt v. 
State, 125 Idaho 424, 426, 871 P.2d 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1994).)  Lastly, 
regarding alleged “evidence of material fact not previously presented” requiring a 
vacation of the conviction and sentence, the court found that Cook “fails to set 
forth what that evidence is.”  (R., pp. 124-25.) 
 Cook’s initial post-conviction counsel moved to withdraw (R., pp. 127-28), 
and Cook filed a Motion for Appointment of Conflict Counsel (R., pp. 129-33).  
His motion was supported by the affidavit of his father, Robert Cook (R., pp. 134-
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43), and an unsworn statement allegedly penned by Nathan Ames, a friend 
interviewed by police on the night of the incident (R., pp. 144-45).   
Cook’s motion to appoint conflict counsel was granted on December 21, 
2015, at which point the state’s motion for summary dismissal and the court’s 
notice of intent to dismiss were still pending.  (R., pp. 153-54.)  New counsel 
Michael Nelson was given until January 11, 2016 to file “any response” to the 
state’s motion, or to file amended pleadings.  (R., pp. 154-55.) 
 On January 11, Cook filed a Motion To Extend Time To File Additional 
Information.  (R., pp. 156-57.)  In it, counsel Nelson stated that “[a]fter speaking 
with the Petitioner, there are several affidavits that the Petitioner would like to 
submit to support his original petition and Counsel needs an additional week to 
submit the information to the court.”  (R., p. 156.)  That extension was granted, 
giving Cook until January 18, 2016, to file additional information.  (R., p. 158.)  
No additional information was filed.  (See generally, R.) 
 The district court held a status conference on February 8, 2016 and took 
up the motion to extend time: 
MR. NELSON: So Cook is a case where the Court entered a notice 
of intent to dismiss. 
 
COURT: Right. 
 
MR. NELSON: I filed a motion to extend time. I did speak with Mr. 
Cook himself. He asked me to follow up with a few people. 
Unfortunately, this is a tough one because the information— 
 
COURT: Hold on …. We’re back with Cook. 
 
MR. NELSON: All right. So I notice that the—the Court had filed a 
notice of intent to dismiss. Mr. Cook had—wanted me to file some 
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additional affidavits. Upon research, it appears that they would be 
affidavits containing hearsay. I just spoke to his previous lawyer. 
 
I know that I then filed a motion for additional time. Upon my 
research, I didn’t see any additional information but I know the 
Court filed for a status conference. I guess I’m not sure exactly 
what the Court’s position was at this time, Your Honor. 
 
COURT: Well, I don’t know that there’s been any additional 
information filed. 
 
MR. NELSON: No. I haven’t, Your Honor. 
 
(R., pp. 160-61; 2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 5 – p. 5, L. 5.)  The state submitted on its 
briefing and relied on “the Court’s notice of intent that the case would be 
dismissed at this time for failure to support the petition as alleged.”  (2/8/17 Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 12-15.)  The district court dismissed the petition.  (R., pp. 162-73; 2/8/17 
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 16-17.) 
 Five days after the dismissal, Cook filed a pro se Notice To The Court and 
Request for Time Extension on Motion to Reconsider.  (R., pp. 174-179.)  In it, 
he accused post-conviction counsel Nelson of lying to the court, only speaking to 
him one time, and never contacting witnesses.  (See R., pp. 174-79.)  The district 
court never ruled on this motion.  (See generally, R.) 
 On March 17, 2016, Steve Carpenter filed notice that he was substituting 
in as counsel in place of Nelson.  (R., pp. 191-92.)   
Cook thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the district court 
to reconsider its dismissal of the petition.  (R., pp. 194-97.)  The Motion for 
Reconsideration set forth several bases for relief, including that Cook “obtained 
affidavits and prepared to proffer evidence through witness testimony to the 
court,” but that counsel Nelson “failed to file affidavits or interview witnesses.”  
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(R., p. 195.)  Cook also alleged that he “instructed previous counsel [Nelson] to 
motion for reconsideration within the (14) fourteen-day timeframe outlined in 
IRCP 11(a)(2)(b)” but “[t]hat motion was never filed.”  (R., p. 195.)  Cook stated 
that “[d]ue to these errors” and others, he “simply asks that this matter be 
calendared for an evidentiary hearing and the dismissal be overturned.”  (R., 
p. 196.)  The state objected, arguing that whether the motion was construed 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, Cook had failed to set forth 
grounds for relief.  (R., pp. 200-05.) 
The district court heard argument on the Motion to Reconsider.  (R., 
pp. 207-08.)  At argument, Cook’s counsel stated that: 
Mr. Cook has identified issues of fact that were apparent in the 
initial case regarding both the clothing that he was wearing, the 
items that he was arrested with, the description of his vehicle he 
was arrested on to the police, his whereabouts and location at the 
time of the arrest and he has not been allowed the opportunity to 
present this evidence to the Court. 
 
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 1.)  Cook’s counsel argued that he was not 
“throwing aspersions” on the court, but on previous counsel, and “due to inaction 
of counsel and failure to collect and present evidence that Mr. Cook has not 
been given his fair shot in court.” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 2-6.)  He specifically took 
issue with Nelson not “filing any information or any amended petition to 
overcome the Court’s notice of intent or motion for summary dismissal,” and 
never giving Cook “an opportunity to present by affidavit or testimony any of the 
evidence that would indicate that there’s an issue of material fact in this case.”  
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 17-21.)  Counsel also argued that “[w]e have filed affidavits 
by Robert Cook, [Louannie] Stambaugh and Nathan [Ames] in support of—as 
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well as an affidavit by Mr. Cook which should be in the court record that also 
testified to points of evidence.”1  (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 11-15.) 
The district court began its ruling by finding that the Motion to Reconsider 
was “a motion to amend the pleadings under 59.”  (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.)  
The court went through the procedural history of the case and found that: 
On the 29th of January, the Court issued a notice of hearing to set 
the case for a status conference on February 8 and Mr. Nelson 
appeared and advised the Court there’s no additional admissible 
evidence to be filed and the State had already filed its motion for 
summary dismissal. The Court had already filed its notice of intent 
to dismiss if nothing else was filed and therefore, the Court ordered 
a dismissal of the petition and detailed the findings on the February 
22 order and it’s that order that the defendant—or the plaintiff is 
now seeking to reconsider or amend. 
 
And I’m going to deny the motion to reconsider or amend. I find 
there’s no errors of law or facts surrounding the Court’s dismissal. 
So I’m going to deny the motion. 
 
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 11.)  The district court denied the Motion to 
Reconsider.  (R., pp. 209-10.)  Cook timely appealed, only from the order 
denying reconsideration.  (R., pp. 211-14, 233-37.)  
                                            
1 Cook’s affidavit is in the record at R., pp. 198-99, and Stambaugh’s affidavit 
can be found at R., pp. 180.  The Ames and Robert Cook affidavits were not in 
the original record on appeal, nor in the district court’s register of actions, but 
have since been augmented to the appellate record at Aug. pp. 4-5, and pp. 8-
17. 
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ISSUE 
 
Cook states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether the district court analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration 
under the wrong standard, and so, erroneously denied that motion. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Cook failed to show that the district court improperly denied his motion for 
reconsideration, regardless of whether the motion should have been analyzed 
under Rule 59 or Rule 60? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Cook Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For 
Reconsideration, Regardless Of Whether The Motion Should Have Been 
Analyzed Under Rule 59 Or 60 
 
A. Introduction 
 Cook argues on appeal that the district court erred by analyzing his motion 
to reconsider under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59 as opposed to Rule 60.  He 
contends that because his motion presented new information to the court, and 
was filed beyond the 14-day time limit, a Rule 60 analysis was warranted.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-15.)  He argues that whether or not this Court considers 
the underlying merits of his Rule 60(b) claim, the denial of his motion should be 
vacated, and this case remanded.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-22.) 
 These arguments fail.  Cook’s motion presented either information that 
was already known to the court, or that while “new” was insignificant.  The district 
court therefore properly considered, and denied, Cook’s motion per Rule 59.  
Further, even if the motion was analyzed under Rule 60, Cook has failed to show 
that he was entitled to relief as a matter of law.  Regardless of which rule is 
applied the district court correctly denied his motion to reconsider. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Decisions to deny a post-judgment motion, whether brought under 
I.R.C.P. 59(e) or 60(b), are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Straub v. Smith, 
145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007); Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 
646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982); Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 883, 318 P.3d 
646, 652 (Ct. App. 2013).  “[W]hen the discretion exercised by a trial court is 
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affected by an error of law,” this Court’s role is ordinarily to “note the error and 
remand the case for additional findings.”  Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 
228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010).  Remand is not required, however, if “there is an 
alternative ground for upholding the district court’s decision.”  See id; Bias v. 
State, 159 Idaho 696, 706, 365 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied 
(Mar. 3, 2016). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Analyzed Cook’s Motion Under Rule 59(e) 
 
When a litigant files an ambiguously titled post-judgment motion, such as 
Cook’s “Motion to Reconsider” here, “courts consider the substance of the 
motion to determine whether it is properly a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60 motion.”  
See Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060 (citing Vierstra v. Vierstra, 
153 Idaho 873, 879, 292 P.3d 264, 270 (2012)). “A motion is most appropriately 
considered a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) when it 
is filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment and is premised solely upon 
information that was before the court at the time judgment was rendered.”  Bias, 
159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 
376, 384 (2004); Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 883, 318 P.3d 646, 652 
(Ct. App. 2013).  Where a motion presents “new information or issues for the 
court to consider, treatment as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b) is most appropriate.”  Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060; Ross v. 
State, 141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005).  However, a 
motion that does not present new information will not automatically be treated as 
a Rule 60 motion, simply because it was not timely filed.  See Ross, 141 Idaho at 
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671-72, 115 P.3d at 762-63 (noting that “insofar as [defendant’s motion] could be 
treated as a Rule 59(e) motion” it was untimely and therefore subject to denial). 
Here, the district court explicitly analyzed Cook’s ambiguously titled 
Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 59.  (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.)    This 
was the correct analysis because, even though the motion was not filed in 14 
days, there was no new information in it pertaining to the judgment.  For 
example, Cook’s motion goes through a laundry list of procedural history leading 
up to the dismissal.  (See R., pp. 194-96, ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 7.)  But the case’s 
procedural history would have already been known to the court.  Likewise, post-
judgment procedural history, or other “new” information regarding alleged post-
judgment events—such as decisions whether to file a motion to reconsider—by 
definition could not have pertained to the judgment, and are therefore irrelevant 
to the analysis.  (See R., pp. 195-96.)  Finally, Cook’s motion states that he 
“obtained affidavits and prepared to proffer evidence through witness testimony 
to the court,” and that counsel Nelson “failed to file affidavits or interview 
witnesses.”  (See R., p. 195, ¶¶ 5-6.)  But Nelson himself informed the court of 
this prior to dismissal: 
MR. NELSON: All right.  So I notice that the—the Court had filed a 
notice of intent to dismiss.  Mr. Cook had—wanted me to file some 
additional affidavits.  Upon research, it appears that they would be 
affidavits containing hearsay.  I just spoke to his previous lawyer. 
 
I know that I then filed a motion for additional time.  Upon my 
research, I didn’t see any additional information but I know the 
Court filed for a status conference. I guess I’m not sure exactly 
what the Court’s position was at this time, Your Honor. 
 
COURT: Well, I don’t know that there’s been any additional 
information filed. 
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MR. NELSON: No. I haven’t, Your Honor. 
 
(2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 5.)  Thus, the allegations that Nelson did not file 
affidavits and did not meet with witnesses were not new information, as Nelson 
explicitly told the court that he “just spoke to [Cook’s] previous lawyer,” and that 
he did not file the affidavits that Cook wanted him to file.  (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – 
p. 5, L. 5.)  Because Cook’s motion to reconsider simply restated these matters, 
already in the record, it presented no new information, and the district court 
correctly analyzed Cook’s motion under Rule 59(e).   
As for the motion itself, it did not identify with particularity any Rule 59(e) 
grounds for reconsideration, nor did it identify any particular errors of fact or law 
in the district court’s notice of intent to dismissal.2  (See R., pp. 194-97.)  
Likewise, Cook’s counsel stated that there were “issues of fact” that could have 
been identified by Nelson in an amended petition, but did not explain with any 
particularity how those facts would have affected the grounds for dismissal.  (See 
generally, 4/21/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 23.)  The court therefore correctly 
denied the motion, finding there were “no errors of law or facts surrounding the 
Court’s dismissal [of Cook’s petition].”  (4/21/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-11.)  
 Cook argues the district court erred by applying Rule 59 instead of Rule 
60(b) because his motion met the two-part test of (1) not being filed within 14 
days and (2) presenting new evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.)  As set 
                                            
2 To the extent the motion argued that Cook “was not allowed to be present at 
the hearing” for summary dismissal, Cook did not cite to any legal authority that 
would show this was an error justifying Rule 59 relief.  (See R., p. 195.)  Cook 
has not renewed this claim on appeal and appears to have abandoned it.  (See 
generally, Appellant’s brief.) 
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forth above, his motion passes only the first prong of this test and fails on the 
second. 
 Cook argues he presented new evidence supporting a new claim that 
post-conviction counsel Nelson “had been completely absent in his 
representation,” which necessitates a Rule 60(b) analysis.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 13.) 
 This argument fails for several reasons.  First, Cook is arguing for the first 
time on appeal that Nelson was “completely absent in his representation.”  The 
motion itself did not allege complete absence—it alleged that Nelson did not 
contact Cook and his witnesses as much as Cook wanted, and did not file 
everything he was asked to file.  (See generally, R., pp. 194-97.)3  Thus, arguing 
that the motion presented a “new claim that Mr. Nelson had been completely 
absent” overstates the claim actually presented below. 
 Second, as explained above, Nelson’s decision not to file the affidavits 
was not new information.  Nelson himself made clear to the court that he did not 
file any affidavits because he knew the affidavits contained inadmissible 
hearsay.  (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 5.)  The affidavits themselves only 
support this rationale, as they contain irrelevant statements or inadmissible 
                                            
3 While Cook’s affidavit in support of his motion states that “I have been unable 
to contact my prior counsel, Michael Nelson, throughout these proceedings” (R., 
p. 198), this is belied not only by Nelson’s statements to the district court (2/8/16 
Tr., p. 4, Ls. 8-10), but by Cook’s own affidavit incorporating a letter to the court 
(R., p. 177 (stating “[s]ince the appointment of [Mike] Nelson, he has spoken to 
me by phone once on the last week of January,” (capitalization corrected)).)  
Taken together, neither the record nor Cook’s motion show that Nelson was 
“completely absent.” 
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hearsay, and do not contain any new information that would support a claim that 
Nelson was “completely absent.”  (See Aug., pp. 4-17.) 
 Cook argues that “even if Rule 59(e) were the controlling provision in this 
case, the district court still erred in its analysis of Mr. Cook’s motion under that 
provision.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13, n. 6.)  Specifically, Cook takes issue with the 
district court’s statement that “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently support his 
Motion for Reconsideration.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13, n. 6 (citing R., p. 209, 
emphasis in Appellant’s brief).)  He argues that because a Rule 59(e) analysis is 
limited to the information in the record, the court’s statement about insufficient 
support betrayed an analysis that went beyond the record.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p.13, n. 6.)  This is incorrect, because it is axiomatic that civil litigants must 
support the motions that they file.  Rule 59 itself requires that the motion “must 
be accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in support of 
the motion.”  I.R.C.P. 59(a)(2).  Here, Cook’s motion failed to support, either as a 
legal or factual matter, any grounds that would have justified granting Rule 59(e) 
relief.  The court thus correctly concluded that Cook’s motion failed to show 
“errors of law or facts surrounding the Court’s dismissal” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 10, 
Ls. 9-10), and its statement regarding “insufficient support” does not reveal any 
analytical error. 
 Cook has failed to show that there was new information in his motion that 
would have necessitated a Rule 60 analysis, and has failed to show that a Rule 
59 motion would have prevailed on the merits.  The district court therefore did 
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not abuse its discretion by analyzing, and denying, Cook’s motion pursuant to 
Rule 59(e). 
D. Alternatively, Even If The Court Was Required To Analyze Cook’s Motion 
Under Rule 60, The Motion Was Correctly Dismissed Because Cook Has 
Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To Relief As A Matter Of Law 
 
Even where a district court errs by analyzing an ambiguously titled motion 
under Rule 59, as opposed to Rule 60, this Court will not reverse unless the 
appellant can show he was “entitled to relief as a matter of law under Rule 
60(b).”  Bias, 159 Idaho at 706-07, 365 P.3d at 1060-61.  Under Rule 60(b) a 
party may seek relief from a final judgment for such reasons as “mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” or for “any other reason that 
justifies relief.”  I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), (6); see also Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d 
at 1060. 
In Bias, the district court erroneously analyzed an ambiguously titled post-
judgment motion under Rule 59(e) as opposed to Rule 60.  Id.  The Bias Court 
found that the motion “contained new information via allegations of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel,” and therefore should have been analyzed 
under Rule 60, “[r]egardless of whether new information or issues presented” in 
such a motion “are sufficient to establish grounds for relief.”  Id. 
But the Bias Court also found that while the district court erred by treating 
Bias’s motion as a Rule 59(e) motion, where a trial court order “is based on an 
erroneous legal theory, but is supported by a correct alternative legal theory, we 
will nonetheless uphold the trial court’s decision.”  Id.  The Bias Court 
accordingly “turn[ed] to whether Bias was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).”  Id. 
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Bias argued “that the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Eby v. State, 
148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010), establishes that ineffective assistance by 
post-conviction counsel constitutes a sufficient basis for granting relief under 
Rule 60(b).”  Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060.  However, the Court 
rejected this argument, and its reasoning is directly applicable here: 
Bias’s reliance on Eby is misplaced. In Eby, the petitioner’s post-
conviction counsel failed to file any response to the court’s 
issuance of no less than five notices of its intention to dismiss his 
case for inactivity pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c). After the court 
dismissed the case under Rule 40(c), petitioner’s fourth post-
conviction attorney sought relief under Rule 60(b), which the court 
denied. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that 
petitioners do not have a right to effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. However, because post-conviction proceedings 
constitute “the only available proceeding for [a petitioner] to 
advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence,” 
relief may be warranted under Rule 60(b) in the “unique and 
compelling circumstances” where a petitioner experiences “the 
complete absence of meaningful representation.” (emphasis 
added).  
 
Here, Bias’s motion does not allege a complete absence of post-
conviction representation, nor does the record support such a 
finding. Bias’s post-conviction counsel filed a responsive brief and 
supporting affidavits after the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal. Unlike the petitioner in Eby, Bias did not experience a 
“complete absence of meaningful representation.” Bias’s 
dissatisfaction with his post-conviction counsel’s performance does 
not constitute the “unique and compelling circumstances” required 
before a court may grant relief under Rule 60(b). Therefore, 
because Bias was not entitled to relief as a matter of law under 
Rule 60(b), we uphold the district court’s denial of his post-
judgment motion. 
 
Id. at 706–07, 365 P.3d at 1060–61 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in 
original). 
Bias and Eby resolve the issues here.  Even if the district court erred by 
not analyzing Cook’s motion under Rule 60, Cook was not entitled to relief 
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pursuant to Rule 60 as a matter of law.  Cook has no statutory or constitutional 
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.  Murphy v. State, 
156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014) (“Where there is no right to 
counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.”).  Eby 
provides a narrow ability to bring a Rule 60(b)(6) claim for ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel, but it is well settled that this exception only applies 
where a petitioner experiences a complete absence of meaningful 
representation.  See Eby, 148 Idaho at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004; see also Bias, 
159 Idaho at 706–07, 365 P.3d at 1060–61.  Here, the record establishes without 
doubt that Nelson was not completely absent from the case.  To the contrary, 
Nelson discussed the case with Cook (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 8-9; R., pp. 156, 177), 
spoke with prior counsel about the case (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 21-22), filed a 
pleading requesting an extension of time (R., pp. 156-57), performed research 
(2/8/16, p. 4, Ls. 24-25), and appeared at a status conference (2/8/16 Tr.).  
While Cook may wish in hindsight that Nelson did things differently, Nelson 
explained on the record why he did not file additional information.  (2/8/16 Tr., 
p. 4, L. 8 – p. 5, L. 1.)  And while Cook may have been dissatisfied with his 
counsel, dissatisfaction alone is not a “unique and compelling” circumstance 
justifying relief.  Because Cook has shown nothing near a “complete absence of 
meaningful representation,” he cannot find Rule 60(b)(6) relief on this claim. 
 Cook also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Nelson’s “failure to file 
a motion for reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing the petition at Mr. 
Cook’s request” presents separate grounds for relief based specifically on Rule 
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60(b)(1).  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-22.)  He contends that Nelson’s actions led to 
excusable neglect, akin to a failure to “reasonably act to prevent improper default 
judgment.”  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)  Cook argues that because he “timely 
instructed, and thus, reasonably relied on, his attorney, Mr. Nelson, to file a 
motion for reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing his petition,” that he 
would have been entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).  (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) 
 This argument fails for several reasons.  First, Cook never argued below 
that Nelson’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration was excusable neglect; 
the district court accordingly had no opportunity to rule on the question.  (See R., 
pp. 194-97; 4/21/16 Tr., pp. 4-8); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 
641, 644 (1998).  Nor does Cook allege now that as a matter of law counsel is 
always obligated to file, upon demand, every pleading that a civil litigant asks 
them to file.  (See generally, Appellant’s brief.) 
Cook has also failed to show that refusal to file a reconsideration motion 
here would have been neglect, as opposed to a reasonable strategic decision.  
Cook argues that Nelson committed neglect by not filing a motion to reconsider 
because Nelson could have premised such a motion on existing information in 
the record—namely, statements from Nathan Ames and Robert Cook.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p. 20-22.)  This argument fails for several reasons.  The 
statement from Nathan Ames was not sworn, and does not refute the evidence 
that “he, Mr. Ames, had told officers Mr. Cook had not been riding the motorcycle 
the police had been pursuing.”  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 21 (citing R., p. 144).)  
Rather, Ames’s statement contains the double-hearsay assertion that “[trial 
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counsel] also told Jeremy & his family that I told the police that Jeremy was in 
fact driving,” which Ames only contends the discovery does not say.  (R., 
p. 144.)4  Likewise, oblique statements from Robert Cook that “there existed 
numerous witness that would have testified that Jeremy has never been to the 
‘Rodeo Bar’, where this alleged crime had supposedly taken place,” would 
likewise have been inadmissible hearsay. (R., p. 140.) 
Even if these statements were admissible, it is farfetched that they would 
have affected the notice of dismissal.  Cook’s petition was dismissed because, 
among other things, his guilty plea waived “all non-jurisdictional defects and 
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings”—including the 
“failure of counsel to present a defense.”  (R., pp. 123-24.)  The guilty-plea 
waiver would therefore include failures to present the defenses Cook argues the 
statements support (including an alibi defense, a mistaken-motorcycle defense, 
and a defense that Cook had not been to the Rodeo Bar on the night in 
question).  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)  Given the dismal odds that the 
statements of Ames and Robert Cook could have affected the dismissal, even 
assuming they were admissible, Cook fails to show that Nelson’s refusal to file a 
motion based on them was due to neglect, as opposed to a reasonable, tactical 
decision. 
                                            
4 It is worth noting that the discovery appears to say exactly that: the police 
report states that “Ames said the Suzuki belonged to Cook,” and that “Ames said 
the motorcycle belonged to Cook. Cook drove it to the Sportsman’s bar this 
evening.” (PSI, pp. 41-42.) 
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 Finally, Cook has failed to show that the dismissal of this petition was the 
result of the alleged excusable neglect.  See Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 
566 P.2d 758 (1977).  In Sines, the court clerk failed to notify the parties of an 
entry of judgment.  Id. at 436, 566 P.2d at 759 (drolly noting that the judgment 
notice “took its place in the court files where it obviously served no purpose 
whatever”).  The parties were therefore unaware that judgment was entered, and 
as a result of the blunder, the appellant missed the deadlines for filing post-
judgment motions.  Id.  Critically, it was the untimeliness of the filing—and not 
the merits of the claims—that doomed the motions: 
On December 10, 1974, counsel for appellants, unaware that 
judgment had been entered, filed a motion to set aside or amend 
the findings, a motion for judgment n.o.v., and, in the alternative, a 
motion for a new trial. At a hearing on December 20, 1974, the trial 
court, by order entered the same date, denied all three motions, 
not on their merits, but as not having been timely filed. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The Court understandably found that failure to timely file 
motions, due only to a lack of notice, constituted excusable neglect.  See id. at 
438-40, 566 P.2d at 761-63.  The Sines Court therefore reversed the denial of 
the Rule 60 motion.  Id. at 440, 566 P.2d at 763. 
By contrast, there was no blown filing deadline here, no default judgment, 
nor any other perceptible disadvantage stemming from Nelson’s alleged neglect 
by not filing the motion.  After Nelson left the case, Cook’s new post-conviction 
counsel filed a reconsideration motion, and Cook accordingly never lost the 
opportunity to challenge the dismissal through a motion to reconsider.  The 
motion for reconsideration was ultimately considered and denied on the merits.  
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-10 (“And I’m going to deny the motion to reconsider or 
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amend. I find there’s no errors of law or facts surrounding the court’s 
dismissal.”).)   Consequently, Cook has failed to show complete absence of 
meaningful assistance or excusable neglect, and has therefore failed to show 
that he is entitled to Rule 60 relief on the merits.  Even if his motion should have 
been analyzed as a Rule 60 motion it was correctly denied by the district court. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the denial of Cook’s 
Motion to Reconsider. 
 DATED this 20th day of March, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of March, 2017, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd 
